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T H E S I S
THE INDORSUR AiD MAKER OF A NOTE AS SURETIES











rIhe origin of the contract of suretyship is veiled
in the mists o antiquity. The sanction of the contract,
like that of all contracts, rested at first simply on the
sacredness of the promise and found its binding force in
religion. Tlhe statenrnt that the contract of surety-
ship as we know it, i:; dertved from the Civil Law is not
quite accurate. Suretyship was known and recognized b,,,
the §ews before Romulus sent forth his first decree. "He
that is surety for a stranger shall srart for it and he
that hateth suretyship is sure". Proving that out of t
the social condition of the Jews the contract of surety-
ship must have been used to a large extent to call forth
the warning and denunciation of the Solomon. Again, Erac-
ton gives testimony to the effept that a contract of
suretyship existed as jart and parcel of the conmon law.
And an examinatinn of the law of geveral semi-civilized
nations shows tat they recognize such a contract.
Distinct and independent societies, when they reach
a certain degree of civilization ,originate and adopt sir-
ilar laws, and the law of suretyship is one of the laws
so recognized. .So we may say it has a distinct and sepz
arate origin among different peoples. The iore cor-
rect statement would be that many of the principles gol-
erning the law of suretyship as recognized by the Romn
law is applied to suretyship in our Iaw. The reason for
thus ingrafting the principles of the civil law of sure-
tyship is that the civil law, in he process of evolutioi
had reached a higher degree of rerfection than that of
the law of suretyship of any other people.
Judge Cooley defines a surety as follows:- "A sure-
ty is ayperson who being liable to pay a debt or perform
an obligation, is entitled, if it be enforced against him,
to be indemnified by some other person w' o ought himself
to have made rayment or performed before the surety was
(a)
compelled to do so". Suretyship is distinguished from
guaranty by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as follows:
"A contract of suretyship creates a direct liability to
the creditor for the act to be performed by the debtor,
but a contract of guaranty creates a liability only for
his ability to perform such act. A surety is an in-
(a) Smith v. Sheldon, 35 ;tich. 42.
surer of the debt, while a guarantor is only an insurer
of the solvency of the debtor .b)
One my become a sutety by express contract, by in-
dorsing or signing a note, by mortgage of wife's sepa-
rate property to secure the debts of her husband, by a-
greement of prtner to assume debts of the firm, by pledg-
ing property to secure the debt of another, and by enter-
ing into a joint obligation. The consideration may be
srme advantage to the principal or surety, or disadvantage
or detriment to the creditor, usually the sane consider-
ation that supports the original contract supports the
contract f suretyship. The contract is not uberrimae
fidei in its inception but becomes so after ij. is once
entered into.
It is my purpose to consider the indorser and maker
of a note as a surety.
(a) Campbell v. Sherman, 151 Pa. 3t. 70.
CJIAP L ER II.
rLROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT AN %,PPAR2:T I:DORSER IS
NvRELY A SURETY
'That a ccntract governed by the lav .- merchant is
a contract of suretyship does iot usually appear upon the
face of the instrument; it bears no ear marks to distin-
guish it from ordinary business yalm r. This is necessa-
ry in order that such an instrument fulfil the purpose
of its creation, i. e., to answer as a circulating medi-
um in the busy warts of' trade. The busines3 man is al-
ways justified in treating an instrument in the law r.
merchant as he finds it from an inspection; he is not
bound to inquire into its inception as to whether the in-
strument is accomodation or business papr. !.e is enti-
tled to treat all parties as their names ppear, thus if
a man appear as a maker of an instrument in the la, ,a
merchant the holder without notice, is entitled to treat
him as such and, , the fact that he is only surety does
not affect the contract and oblige the holder without
notice to treat him as surety. (a)
(A) 9 S. & P. 2,29.
The rule being that a holder without notice, is en-
titled to treat parties to a note or bill as they appear,
the law governing accoimiodation pale r,w'en in the hands 0
of bona fide holders, the same as the 1:,w governing busi-
ness T.aper.
A perplexed question arises in considering the right
and obligations of several rersons who jiake or endorse a
note for the acconmodation.of a third -erson. .. and EL.
endorse a note for the accotinodation of C. C. transfers
the note to I). for a valuable consideration. D. recoveB
of ',.. What rights has- B. against A? T1,ere appears
to be three rules applied by ourts of different juris-
diction. First, parol evidence c.n not be admitted to
vary the terms of a written contract .and therefore P. may
recover from A. the full amount of the note .(a) Second,
that the resumption is that the y.arties are indorsers
in the order that their names appear; but as soon as it
is shown that the endorsements were made at the same tire
for the accommodation of the naker the paties are, in th
(b)
the absence of agreement, to the contrary,, so-sureties.
ja 2 Camip.
Third, that the 1arties are to show what the contract is,
and in the absence of any proof the liability is as the
narres appear uipon the inst.'unent. ',1ie fi'st ri-le is ap-
plied very sparingly at te present tine. Ti-e third rde
rule is usually applied in this country.
This brings us to a discusiion of the power of an
indorser to show that hia liability is limited by parol
agreennt. A case squarely in point anI ore often cited,
is Hill v. Fly (5 S. & R. 363). In this case one Ely
sold to Hill a certain quantity of coffee and took in pa,
ment certain notes drawn in favDn of Hill by one Lamb,
the understaniing being that the notes were to be taken
as absolute paynent without further recourse to Hill.
Hill indorsed the notes to enable Ely to collect an1 Ely
promised not to hold ill. At the trial this evidence
was rejected as tending to vary the terms of a written
contract. On appeal the court held the evidence admiss-
ible on the ground that the rule of the connon law exclud
ing parole evidence, in this case,would work a fraud anI
as the comuon law courts of Pennsylvania were constitu-
ted the evidence could be admitted the same as if the
cause ;was in chancery.
This case, although frequently cited, 1i::s been sta
ted by judges to ppply to Pemsylvania alone oiiing tr, the
peculiar constitution of her courts. (a) In Lank of the
IT. 7-. v. Dunn ( Peters 58), vher, the case was relied
upon to dhow that the contract implied by law from a
blank indorsement might be thus varied by parol, the
court said:- "In support of this positiA authorities aro
read from 5 S. & -R. 363 and 4 Wash. c@. C. 490. In the
latter case 1.r. Justice Washington says,-'The reasons
which forbid parol evidence to-lter or explain written
apXeements and other instruments do not apply to those
contracts implied by operation r,f law such as the law im-
plies in respect to an indorser of a note of hand. The
evidence of the agreement mde between the plaintiff and
defendants whereby the latt er was to be discharged on the
harTpenning of a particular event was therefore properl y
admitted. T'he decision in 5 S. & F. was on a question
somewhat analagous to the one under consideration except
in the 1-Tesent case there is no allegation of fraud and
the decision in th at case was iiiae to turn, in part at
(a) Tlvre being no equity courts in Pennsylvnia
the ro:,oer of the %ommon Law courts to apply equity doc-
trines i:s more extensive th,.n those of any other state.
least,lpon that ground. In Pennsylvania tiere is no
court of chancery and it is known that the court:3 in that
state admit rarol proof to affect written contracts to
greater extent than is sanctioned in the states where a
chancery jurisdiction is exercised. 'lihe rule has been
differently settled in this court'. It was therefore
held in Eank of U. ;. v. Dunn that one who had indorsed
a note in blank would v ot be permitted to show that 1-e
indorsed it ipon the express condition thai he was not to
be held liable as an indorser in case the note was not
paid by the maker. ;nd this decision was put upon the
express rrounds tha' the liability of parties to instru-
ments in the law X merchant have been fixed by law and f
if parol evidence was admitted to vary the contract the
V. lue of hese instruments as circulating indiu vtould
be greatly deteriorated. Other cases reaching substan-
tially the same conclusion of Eank v. Dunn are .)ale v.
"ear (38 Conn. 15); Chaddock v. Vaunes (35 . J. ,. 517);
Charles v. Dennis (42 17is. ;-5 );
The fennsylvania courts have given t1h doctrine of
the leading case, ]Hill v. Ely, a much more extensive ap-
plication and have carriedvto its full and logical con-
clusion.(F,) I submit that it is difficult to understand
how the privilege of one who indorsed a note on the ex-
press condition that he was not to be liable as indorser
but the indorsement -,as made simply to allow the indors-
ee to sue on the note; or that he was not an indorser of
business paper for ,x valuable consideration but a mere
su tety, to show by parol in an action between the origini
parties, what the true contract was, affects the value of
negotiable paper as ac irculating medium. Ofcourse, the
defend.nt in the case ,f Iill v. Ely would not have bee-n
allowe d to introduce parol evidence to dhow that he was
an indorser without recourse if the note had been nego-
tiated for the court said:- "If those notes had been so
negotiated by Elisha ElyWilliam Kill's mouth would be
stopped; a tiiird person could not be affected ty a latent
agr eement"•
Again, a fraudulent use of t1 statut-s for the pre-
vention of fraud will not be permitted and a court of eq-
uity will interfere a)ainst a party attempting to make
such a statute an instrument of fraud.(b) Now tIL rule
(a) Ross v. Espy, 65 Pa. St. 481.
(b) Ryan v. Dock, 34 N. Y. 307.
of construction requiring that the old evidence cannot be
admitted to vary a contract of the law Y merchant is no
str,nger than the statutory requirenent that certain con-
tracts be in writing. Whenever an indorsee sues his im-
miediate indorser on an indorsement which parties agree
should be without recourse, or one of two accommodating
indorsers, being compelled to pay the note upon which
they were sureties, sues the other accommodating party
as an indorser when they agree between themselves at the
time of indorsement to become cosureties, if the rarol a-
.reement is not allowed to be shown a gross fraud will be
permitted, andunless the rule excluding parol evidence
to show what the contract of a man writing his name on
the back of a negotiable instrument, is, of more force
and strdnger than the statutory rule, the evidlence ought
to be admitted. The court in Ross v. Epsy (supra) says+
"The better opinion on this subject would therefore seem
to be that expressed by 4iayle, J., in Castrique v. Et-
tigag (10 iioore P. C. 108), where he says,-'the liability
of an indorser to his immediate indorsee arises out of a
contract between them and this contract in no case con-
sists exclusively in the writing popularly called an in
dorsement, and which is indded necessary to ti exist-
once but that contrat arises out of the w'ritten indorse-
nent itself, the delivery (if the bill to the indorsee,
and by tie words either spo. en rer written by the party,
and tie circumstances, (such as the usa-e of the place,
the course of dealing between the parties and thieir rela-
tive situation) under which the delivery take3 rlace.
Thius a bill with an unqualified written indorsement may
be delivered and received far the purpose of enabling the
endorsee to receive the money for the account of the in-
dorser, or to enable the indotsee to raise money for his
own rse on the credit of the signature of the indorser,
or with the express stipulation that the indorsee, though
for value, is to claim against the indorsee and acceptor
only and not against the indorser who agtrees to sell his
claim against the rrior party, but stipuL-ttes not to
warrant their solvency. In all these cases the indorsor
i3- not liable to the indorsee and they are ai'l in conform
ity with the general law of contracts, which enables par-
ties to them to limit and iiiodify their liability as they
think fit, providing they do not infringe any prohibitory
law '•
It is submitt:ed that this is a clear statement of
the law, and tha.t it has been fully worked nut by the
Pennsylvania ccurts, also that the reculiar constitution
of the coinon law courts of' Pex nylvania does not give
th'em any more, nor as much po,.vier now, as t:e courts of
the code states to apTly these rules, although equitable
rather than legal.
Pennsylvania makes the intention of the parties the
test of the crntract and if this is exrressed the general
law governing contracts is applied, andif notparol evi-
dence is admitted to show what the agreement really is.
.,ccordinglyr the following cases hold ta.1, as between an
indor-ser and his immediate indorsee, parol evidence i.3
always admissiible to show what the contract is. Patton
v. Pearson(57 .Le. 448), Harrison v. ,:cjin, (18 Iowa 485);
Pike v. Street, (Moody & N1. 236); Johnston v. L~artinus,
(4 Halst. 144);
It seems to be settled however, in many of the stages
states, that parol evidence is not admissible to show
that an ind-orsement in blank was agreed trc be without
recourse(a). However, many courts admit parol evridence
to show that tle contract is one of suretyship and not
(a)Charles v. Dennis, .. .is. 56.
an indorserent; and exclude the sarre kind of evidence
when offered to show that the indorsement is one ithout
recourse.(a) The grounds for the distinction are given
in Esterly v. Earber,(66 Ii. Y. 433) as follows,- after
citing the authority for the rroposition that several
persons who arpear cn a bond, jointly and severally lia-
ble as sureties, may make r . valid parol contracts by
which one indemnifies tie other, the court sayd:- "No
reason exists why the sane principle is not applicable
to notes and bills of exchange. The terms of' the cont-
ract contained in instrumen' s of this character, which
are within its scope to define and regulate, cna not be
changed by parol; but the understanding between the in-
dorsers is a distinct and separate subject, an.outside iat
ter which tray be proved independent of, and without any
regard to the instruient itself."
'Ihe theory th1erefore, on which the Pennsylvania
courts admit rarol evidence to show that an apparent in-
dorseirent is a contract of suretyship is that to exclude
the evidence would Iz& fraud and the theory of the iLe :*
A
(a) Dale v. Gear, 38 Uonn. 15.
Fassen v. ::iibbard, 55 l. Y. 455.
Esterly v. Larber, (supra).
York courts is that the understanding between the sever-
al r.aties who ap~i ar as indorsers are sureties, i:i an
independent and collateral matter.
The case of Passon v. Hubbard, (55 !. Y. 4,5) althouki
frequently cited to establish the doctrine th:at an in-
dorser cannot introduce arol evidence to show that he in-
dorsed without recourse does not decide thatpoint.
Brander and Hubbard were partners, tfe jartnership was
dissolved and Hdbbard was authorized to wind up the busi
ness; in pursuance of this authority he indorsed a note
payab&6e to one ilartin and made by a stranger to satisfy
a claim ar-ainst Lhe old firm. Th-e indorsement was in
the following words:- "Lrander and Hubbard in liquida-
tion of old firm" . The defence claimed that the words
"in liquidation of the old firm", showed that the note
was given to liquidate the old business, ,i-ereopcn the
court incidentally remarked that Par.2ons says:- "To re-
lieve one who indorses paper from liability, as such, he
must insert in the contract itself words clearly expres3-
ing such intention. 2,urther it was expressly shown that
the words "in liquidation of old firm" were to distin-
guish the act from acts of a new firm that had bee n form-
ed by the same rarties so that the qestion has not been
decided by the Court of Appeals in this state, whether
an indorser may show y parol that his indorsemert was
understood to be without recourse.
It seems that the Pennsylvania theory, that to allow
an immediate indorser to recover of his indorser when
it was understood that the contract was to be without re-
course, or to llow one o1 several who have indarsed as
co-sureties to. treat the writing as an indorsememt would
work a fraud and therefore parol evidence is admitted to
shaw what the contract is, is the better rule.
C 1I A P T E R III.
0-
-After determiniing the grounds upon which parol ev-
idence is admitted to show that apparent indorsers are
not what t ey seem but are accommodat ion indorsers, -hat
i. *he law as tc: their liabilitr if no agreement is
stated? As already ,-entioned th-xe are three different
rules only two of which prevail to any extent. I slnll
briefly state the rules nd the jurisdictions to which
they apply. In ,Aorth Carolina and those states following
the case of 11aniel v. L.cRea, accoinodation indorsers on a
note for the benefit of third persons, t>ore here is no
sre cial agreement between such indorsers, and neither is
benefited, are co-sureties, entitled to contribution
as against each other? Though there indorseirL s were
ixnie at different times. (a) ..ut the sene -al doctrine
is that in order to constitute indorsers, wr'other for ac-
coTmiodation or value, co sureties so as to be entitled to
contribution agaiast each other, there nmst be a special
(a) Daniel v. LcRea, 2 11awks, 590.
17
agreemenft between them to t 1at effect. At all events
their enga-,,reiients must be joint ari not successive.(a)
In the absence of' such an agreemnent shown in the instru-
rient or by parol the presumption is ti'ht tie r'rties are
to be liable -s in the order that their narn'e appear.
Anorialous Indorser.-- It noa remins t o consider
the anoid;loss indorsement, that is an indorserment by a
stranger before the indorsement ef the payee. "21ow this
act though often spoken or as a kind of indorsement r-. an
anomalous indorsement, is not Iroperly speaking an in-
dorsemer ; ,ilkile the 1apei-15 in the hands of the payee iL
cannot be indorsed by another, according to the meaning
of the indorsermnt in the law # merchant; the payee of
paper,qyable to order nust be the fir-st indorser." (b)
However, some courts treat the !arty as an indorser as
far as they can; such courts refuse to say that he can
be treated as the !aker but treat him as an indorser s-;b
modo. Thus in the case of Colter v. Richards (59 N. Y
478) te doctrine before laid down was re-stated, that tt
(a) idacDonnel v. MJagruder, 3 Peters 470;
ilcCarty v. Roots, 21 4oZ2.( ;
Clapp v. Rich, 13 ,'.ay 403;
Core v. Wilson, 40 Ind. 204;
Easterly v. L.,arbei', ' 26. Y. 46 2;
Gibbons v. L.rchants etc Bank, 85 Ill. 443.
(b Ligelow on Bills and iHotes, p. 33.
presumption that one who indorsed a T romis:zory note in
bla rk, before delivery to the payee, was tliat he intend-
ed to become liable simply s indorser but that
this presumption may be rebutted by yarol.
Tie %eri!xont courts troat ,he crnt-'Vct :s imprfect-
ly ex!r essed and receive rarol, evidence to show what the
real contract is.(a) The general rule is to treat the
(b)
rarty as being in the situation of the makei- of the note.
Il' he signed the I-aper when executed he is co-maker
and joint-maker with the real maker; if he signed at sorie
loiter time he is still maker though not a joint maker,
or maker by way of guarantor or surety.(c)
(a) Sylvester v. Downer, 20 Vt. 355.
(b) Union Vank v. Willet, 8 'Aetcalf, 504;
(c) Seyour v. idLickey 13 0. St.15.
C H A P T E R IV.
0-
RIGHTS O A SURETY
As has been said, the contract of suretyship after
iis inception is uberrime fidei and in general any modi-
fication of the original contract without .he consent of
the ;urety will work his discharge. A surety is enti-
tled to share the benefits of any security which his co-
surety bas taken from his principal for his o-';n indemnity
against loss before being *jnuified(a). If a surety
signs a note payable to A., ;vho declines to receive it,
and it is then negotiated to E. such change in the payee
if ia,1e without the knowledge and consent of the surety,
releases him from liability.(b) A surety has a right
to stand upon the strict terms of his obligation.(c)
T A sure-ty will bedischarged if creiditor by a bindini
arreenent gives fubler t ime fcr the paynnt of debtU-
(a) Hoover v. Likowres, 34 Iowa, 43; Erown v. Nray,
18 N. 11. 102; 2 Rand-Ml 514.
(b' Jones v. Eemsori,
(C) 13', Ill.- 53 6.
principal debtor.(a) Any variation of the contract be-
tween the rrincipal debtor and the assured will dis-
charge surety whether the surety is in fact injured or
notW(b) Lut mere indulgence by an obligee to the princi-
pal debtor will not discharge.(c)
Sureties on a note who have been induced to believe
for five years tha Lhe note has been paid will be dis-
charged. (d)
When of two debtors one is surety for the other and
the common creditor has taken security from the principal
debtor he must give the surety the benefit of the securi-
ty either by paymnt of by subrogation, and creditor, by
surrendering security without voneent of the surety dis-
charges surety pro tanto.(e)
Liability of surety can not be extended by implica-
tion because they h: ve a right to stand upon the oxlict
letter of their contract. (f)
(a) Price v. Dine Sav. Bank, 124 Ill. 317.
(b) 36 Mlinn. 39; Place v. Mv cIlvaine, 38 11. Y. 96.
(c) Powers v. Silberstein, 108 T. Y. 169;
(d) 83 Kentucky 431.
(e) Otis v. Storch, 15 R. L. 41.
(f) 39 Kansas 381.
A note given and accepted in place of a former note
operates to extinguish it together with all rights of ac-
tion thereon, ari therefore surety on former note is dis-
charged. (a)
Unless there is an agreement binding on the credi-
tor the suret: is not released by afcrbearance.(b) The
general rule underlying the cases is said to be, a cred-
itor does not lose his right to hold the surety by inac-
tion of passiveness, except incases in which the surety
has taken such steps as compel the creditor to proceed or
lose his claim. Thins the nere omission by the holder of
a note to present it to the assignee for the benefit of
creditors will not discharge the surety.(c) Neither is
a surety discharged by the creditor's failure to present
the claim to an admini;trator of effects of the princi-
pal debtor(d).
In Scott v. Fisher, 120 1. C. 311) tle facts were as
follows:- J. S. Fisher was the maker of a promissor-
note payrable one day after date to one A. C. Scott, with
(a) 51 Pa. St. 190.
(b) 3 J* J. Marsh. 525.
(c) Barnes v. i owre, 129 Ind. 568; 21 0. St.26.
(d) 4 Smeads & 14,. 465.
with inter)st at eight per cent. The defence relied dip-
on by the surety was that the payee, without his consent,
kr d enter ,d into a vlid agreelirt with the h:.tkOr to ror-
bear and eatend the collection of the note. It appeare,1
that som time after the execution of' the note, the maker
net the payee and oiThP.ed to pay thi note ; Len the payee
remrked that he did not need the money, and that if the
maker would pay him the interest semi-annuallij, he might
keep the note, to which the latter replied,-"all right"
and kept the money; and tiht this ar'eenent was entered
into by the -IJaker and payee of the note withot the knowl
edge or coneent of tie surety thereon. The court below.
instructed the jury that such an agreement was not such a
contract to forbear to collect the note as would dischare
the sur'ty. _iLeld on appeal, error, and that there wa.3 a
binding agreenent extending the time of paymmt and
tberefore the surety -,vas discha-grd.
